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SPATIAL TRANSGRESSION, ANXIETY, AND 





The 2012 performance of Pussy Riot’s “Punk Prayer” in the Cathedral of Christ the 
Savior in Moscow, their subsequent release of an extended and edited video, and their ulti-
mate arrest for committing “hooliganism” generated a large amount of interest both within 
Russia and on an international scale. While Western accounts and analyses were marked 
by their tendency to frame the political content, Russian responses were framed by refer-
ences to tradition and history.  Significantly, there was disagreement amongst the latter with 
regard to the activist value of Pussy Riot. I argue that this ambiguity arises from a profound 
socio-spatial anxiety that was triggered by the Pussy Riot performances but was never ex-
amined. At the core of the anxiety lies a discomfort with the implications of Pussy Riot’s 
spatial transgressions because the techniques used to engage in activism ultimately invoked 
regimes of vision and technology to exert power over the public that implicitly resembles 
surveillance techniques used by the very object of criticism, the Russian regime.
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Introduction
Pussy Riot’s Punk Prayer (Tayler, 2012)
Virgin birth giver of God, drive away Putin 
Drive away Putin, drive away Putin 
Black frock, golden epaulettes
Parishioners crawl bowing 
Freedom’s ghost [has gone to] heaven 
A gay pride parade [has been] sent to Siberia in shackles
Their chief saint is the head of the KGB
He leads a convoy of protestors to jail 
So as not to insult the Holiest One
Woman should bear children and love
Shit, shit, the Lord’s shit, shit, shit, the Lord’s shit 
Virgin birth giver of God, become a feminist
Become a feminist, become a feminist 
The Church praises rotten leaders
The march of the cross consists of black limousines
A preacher is on his way to your school
Go to class and give him money 
Patriarch Gundyay believes in Putin
Would be better, the bastard, if he believed in God 
The Virgin’s belt won’t replace political gatherings
The eternal Virgin Mary is with us in our protests 
Virgin birth Giver of God, drive away Putin 
Drive away Putin, drive away Putin
 
       The performance of Pussy Riot’s “Punk Prayer” on February 21, 2012 in the Cathedral 
of Christ the Savior in Moscow, their subsequent release of an extended and edited two-
minute video and montage, and their ultimate arrest and trial for committing the offense 
of hooliganism generated a large amount of interest both within Russia and on an inter-
national scale. Western accounts and analyses were marked by their tendency to frame 
the actions of the group in terms of what they assumed was the group’s implicit political 
message, which they identified as Russian oppression. In the United States, for example, 
Pussy Riot was seen as a critique of Putin and his administration’s problematic position with 
regard to protecting human rights (Herszenhorn, 2012). Since Pussy Riot was charged and 
found guilty as a result of their activism, they were hailed as martyrs who sacrificed their 
personal lives for altruistic political purposes.
       This perspective is still regnant three years after the members of the group were tried, 
served their sentences, and were eventually released. Just recently, they have been feted 
in the United States by the likes of Madonna, Stephen Colbert, Amnesty International, 
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and even appeared in a cameo on the hit television show House of Cards (“An Award and 
More Support for Pussy Riot,” n.d.). However, Pussy Riot was not hailed as a champion 
of women’s rights or political freedom by anyone in Russia. Attitudes towards the group 
varied significantly between subsets of the Russian population, and there was disagree-
ment amongst discourses of activists with regard to the value of the “Punk Prayer.” Thus, 
no consensus emerged with regard to the symbolic significance of spatial transgressions of 
religious space represented in the video. Given that protest movements were ostensibly 
connected by their opposition to the government and their support of freedom for the 
members of Pussy Riot, why was there such ambiguity surrounding the issue of how to 
assess their activism?
       Previous explanations attest to central issues that account for the ambiguity that sur-
rounds the discourse of Pussy Riot’s activism. These past explanations have consequentially 
valorize socio-historical conditions separately from the performance itself. For instance, 
the notion that feminism was a source of confusion is problematic because it focuses on 
the spectacle of the trial, in part because of the constant rhetoric from pundits that cited 
the female nature of the artists, and their feminine stupidity (Bernstein, 2013). Thus, ques-
tions of feminism alone do not explain confused reactions, nor do they answer why such a 
range of discursive reactions were produced. The explanation that Pussy Riot contradicts 
conventional activist roles and use of space falls short as well. Pussy Riot’s predecessor, the 
Russian performance group Voina, also used music in their famous performances, and like 
Pussy Riot violated public areas (Kolesova, 2013). However, Voina’s message and brand 
of activism was clear to everyone, which indicates there is still much to be explored about 
Pussy Riot’s “Punk Prayer.”
       To fill this gap in scholarship, my argument looks to address the reactions and uneasi-
ness Pussy Riot elicited with a focus on the performance itself, rather than the trial. Thus, 
my subsequent literature review will outline Foucauldian notions of subjectivity and vis-
ibility, which constitute a powerful heuristic tool for situating Pussy Riot’s activism within 
a context of their own making. My hypotheses locates the source of anxiety outside of the 
discursive and rhetorical structures through which the ambiguity is manifested, and hence 
offers a distinct and unexplored vantage point from which to research the discomfort Pussy 
Riot created. 
       I argue that this confusion derives from the fact that the techniques used by Pussy Riot 
for activist means are uncomfortably similar to techniques of surveillance deployed by the 
Russian regime they attempt to mock. Specifically, Pussy Riot’s video mirrors Soviet meth-
ods of surveillance by altering the structure of viewership. The “Punk Prayer” video put 
on YouTube was created by a small group of Pussy Riot’s members, but its position online 
gave everyone in the world access. The performance was nothing short of a spectacle, in 
part because of the emphasis the video placed on the clash between the women and secu-
rity guards on site. The actions of the band traditionally would only be accessible to those 
physically present, but instead became a highly publicized scandal. The overall uncertainty 
the video created derives from a profound socio-spatial anxiety that was triggered by the 
Pussy Riot performances but was never examined as a result of the way the Pussy Riot case 
was consistently constructed discursively through an idealized and oversimplified historical 
narrative of individual resistance to tyrannical governance. 
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Literature Review
Past Discourse
       The techniques Pussy Riot used in their “Punk Prayer” consequentially harken back 
to surveillance techniques used by the Soviet and Russian government. My literature 
review begins with an analysis of past scholarship on the words of the “Punk Prayer” in 
order to situate the chant and establish the presence of discursive and uneasy reactions. This 
is followed by an explanation of the speech transgressions that occur within the religious 
framework of prayer. I explain how this speech act and video implicitly resemble similar 
practices by the Russian government, with an analysis of both spectacle and surveillance. 
       Reactions to the lyrics of the “Punk Prayer” vary between the West and Russia, and 
scholars disagree on which elements of the lyrics are most important. This response is not 
particularly surprising given the range of political and social topics Pussy Riot includes in 
the lyrics of their chant. Scholarship is categorized by how an examination of the lyrics 
is read as auxiliary to sociopolitical critique, with either a religious, feminist, or political 
focus. While this body of work draws valid conclusions, selective reading for predetermined 
connections misses a fundamental unconscious dimension that connects the video to spatial 
anxiety.  
       Pussy Riot’s influence as religious activists was debated in a range of news forums and 
articles (Lipman, 2012). Many felt the group violated Article 282 of the Russian Criminal 
Code, which prevents citizens from criticizing religious elements (Töpfer, 2014). The 
women chant about the church with the words “duty free,” a reference to a suspected tax 
scam run by the head of the Russian Orthodox Church (Tayler, 2012). While the church 
denied any illegal activity, several Russian newspapers, including the Moscow Times reported 
that tax dollars were siphoned through duty-free cigarettes (“Russia Church in Gold 
Watch Row,” 2012). The chief church Metropolitan behind the scheme was “Patriarch 
Kirill of Moscow and All Russia;” referenced in the “Punk Prayer” as “Patriarch Gundyay 
[Patriarch Krill who] believes in Putin” (Vel’ko, 2009).
       Even during the communist era, when the connection between church and state was 
hostile (as when the Bolsheviks murdered religious leaders and destroyed churches to make 
room for Soviet monuments) several high-ranking church officials, including Vladimir 
Gundyayev (the future Patriarch Kirill), continued to benefit from a series of government 
connections. The “Punk Prayer” implies as much with its reference to “rotten leaders” 
which alludes to Church corruption (Tayler, 2012). Many considered such references a 
way for the chant to reference Russia’s tsarist past when the church and the monarchy 
were inseparable (Petrenko, 2009). This connection was lost during the communist era of 
the 1920s, when the Church's authority in Soviet Union significantly waned. While many 
church officials had reached positions of high social and political power, the country quick-
ly shifted to Marxist ideas that labeled religion as “the opiate of the people” (Curtis, 1996).
       However, the “Punk Prayer” lyrics were not universally recognized as a religious 
statement. Motivated by the phrase of the “Punk Prayer” that pleads “Virgin birth-giver 
of God, become a feminist,” many considered the lyrics to be decrying attitudes towards 
women in Russia. Journalists articulate this as a propagation of “an aggressive philosophy 
of feminism in a country where the word ‘feminist’ carries a foul, overtly Western con-
notation” (Tayler, 2012). This feminist reading was especially popular in the West, where 
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almost all scholarship and media labeled Pussy Riot “feminists,” in part because of the 
group’s female base, as well as self-projected feminist message (“Pussy Riot! A Punk Prayer 
for Freedom,” 2013). The harsh lyrics were thus viewed as contemporary iteration of earlier 
groups’ messages such as 1990s riot grrrl bands including Bikini Kill, which preceded Pussy 
Riot in a shared ideological genealogy of progressive activism that endeavored to establish 
new paradigms of action for women of Russia (Seal, 2013).
       Russian feminism has experienced a similarly fragmented history. During the feminist 
movement in Russia in the late 1970s, citizens viewed notions of feminism as either a posi-
tive means of female liberation or a radical consequence of the West and the United States. 
These conflicting interpretations both divided the population by age and gender lines and 
blurred the definition of the word “feminist” long before Pussy Riot sang their chant 
(Sperling, 1999). A second wave of the feminist movement that took place in the 1990s in 
Russia was similarly discursive in nature. Led by Maria Arbatova and professional women’s 
groups, the movement primarily advocated for women in the workplace. However, as the 
effort progressed, feminist groups shifted to a range of non-governmental organizations, and 
lacked cohesive ideological goals (Zdravomyslova, 2002). 
       Finally, many assumed Pussy Riot’s goal was primarily political (Richardson, 2012). 
Despite the fact that the Russian court denied the group’s political intentions and labeled 
their violation “hooliganism motivated by religious hatred,” the chant constantly reiterates 
the need to “drive away Putin” (Tayler, 2012). Anya Bernstein qualifies Pussy Riot’s video 
as political protest cleverly disguised as a mere religious movement. She argues that the 
political context of similar protest movements in Russia combined with direct references to 
Putin indicates that the group was attempting to make a political statement. Later attempts 
by the Russian government to implicate the group as dissidents of the Church were simply 
a means to discredit Pussy Riot and their role as serious activists. She describes how Pussy 
Riot’s bodies become political objects and elements of protest (Bernstein, 2013). Carol 
Rumen expands this assumption of political relevance in her identification of the “Punk 
Prayer” lyrics as “pure protest poetry” in her analysis for the Guardian (Rumen, 2012). Like 
traditional martyrs in Russian history from Pushkin to Dostoevsky, who used poetry and 
stories to criticize an oppressive governmental regimen, the “Punk Prayer” uses the lyrics 
of a song. 
       While all these analytical positions have merit with regards to the surface meaning of 
Pussy Riot’s chant, none consider the implicit message of the lyrics, and why a group of 
unknown women caused such anxiety in Russia. Bernstein perhaps comes the closest to 
explaining why Pussy Riot’s video created so much anxiety with her explanation of the 
discomfort associated with the women’s bodies becoming political objects, yet her ideas 
fail to explain the discursive nature of reactions (Bernstein, 2013). Specifically, she argues 
that even among Pussy Riot’s supporters, the group “did not escape a routinized sexual-
ized gaze, as when one commenter indicated that he preferred their good looks to their 
masked political personae” (Bernstein, 2013). While this explanation helps account for the 
unease caused by the women’s actions, it does not explain the range of reactions the group 
evoked. Similarly, it does not explain why Pussy Riot’s “Punk Prayer” raised such attention 
in Russia, while other more sexualized protests did not garner this response
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       I argue that the lyrics and video of the “Punk Prayer” reveal an implicit socio-linguistic 
context wherein conventional boundaries separating private and public are transgressed to 
the extent that this transgression mirrors strategies of surveillance deployed by the Russian 
government and is thus the source of anxiety generated by its public release. To begin to 
demonstrate the consistency of this level of signification in the lyrics, it is worth noting that 
the socio-linguistic associations of the group’s name, “Pussy Riot,” has not been deeply 
considered by scholars, although some have noted the implications of using an English 
sobriquet. The use of English made the song more accessible to those in the West and of 
an English-speaking background. Most in Russia were not aware of the word’s meaning, 
and news sources in Russia that published on the group generally transcribed the name of 
the group into Cyrillic without providing an actual translation (“ДНИ.РУ / У Мадонны 
проблемы с головой после падения,” 2015).
       Most relevant is the connection between the word “Pussy,” and Russian Mat lexicon, 
a network of forbidden sexual words that has roots dating to the Middle Ages. The Russian 
equivalent of “pussy” is one of four base words that evolved into the rich and imaginative 
jargon used to refer to sexual acts and violence.  Scholars have traced the government’s 
attempt to control and censor the deployment of Mat language; Victor Erofeyev observes 
that Mat was the “Gulag of Russian linguistics—a vast and complicated network that all 
Russians knew about but no one publicly acknowledged” (Erofeyev, 2003). In the Russian 
Gulag, Mat came to denote transgressions of positions of allegiance, either toward the pris-
oners or the guards; “Pussy Riot’s” appropriation of the Mat word implicitly highlights its 
transgressive positionality (Smith, 1998). However, the origins of Mat are not always clear. 
Erofeyev notes that Mat also developed among nobility and the upper class, and was viewed 
as a fashionable trend (Erofeyev, 2003). Considered alongside what appears to be a delib-
erate transgression of other rhetorical and linguistic expectations inherent to conventional 
Russian usage, the lyrics of the song the “Punk Prayer” combined with the Mat title help 
account for the ambivalent and unclear reception of the video.
       This anxiety and discomfort of this Mat language stems in part from the idea that Mat 
is a language not of petty criminals, but instead of government traitors and revolutionists. 
Traditional Russian authors from Pushkin to Chekov employed Mat words, often with 
the goal of criticizing government policies. This was evidenced in Pushkin poem “Tsar 
Nikita and his Forty Daughters,” which decries censorship and details a tale of a lurid sexual 
nature that subtly humiliated the tsarist regime (Remnick, 2014). Similar to the reactions 
to the “Punk Prayer,” critics attempted to remove the political message of Pushkin’s work 
by citing the use of Mat language as mere immaturity. The literary roots of Mat words as 
a means of dissent meant that during the Soviet era, standard Russian “became part of the 
accouterment of the loyal worker [and] a sign of social conformity” (Kovalev, 2014). Thus, 
the implications of the name “Pussy” as well as the linguistic implications and rhetorical 
patterns within the “Punk Prayer” lyrics all point to transgression of conventional boundar-
ies that warrant further explanation.  
Spatial and Linguistic Transgressions
       As evidenced by the historical background outlined above, the use of the word “pussy” 
is not appropriate in Russian public space. During the Soviet and post-Soviet eras, public 
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space became entrenched in political ideologies and power struggles. Jürgen Habermas 
insists that these spectacles in public space have traditionally reflected a fluctuation between 
dissent and reaction. Unlike many countries in Western Europe, the majority of the Soviet 
populace disagreed with elites and the government (Deibert, 2010). The constant dichoto-
my between the general population and government insiders has been longstanding within 
Russian culture, particularly with regard to policies about freedom of expression or journal-
istic integrity. Not only is the use of the word “pussy” not acceptable in everyday Russian 
public space, it is even more forbidden within a religious setting; yet the “Punk Prayer” 
beseeches both God and the Virgin Mary, and is performed in a church. Religious speech 
and prayer abide by a unique set of linguistic and social rules that scholars have analyzed in 
a range of different contexts. Prayer varies from normal speech, as it “challenges ordinary 
habits as well as the theoretical models of speech that are predicated on them” (Keane, 
1997, p. 50). Linguistic theorists argue that this variety and flexibility of prayer means that 
ideas and phrases are implied but not directly referenced. This creates a speech pattern 
where “perceptions of words come from sources beyond the present context, diminishing 
the apparent role of the speaker’s volitional agency” (Keane, 1997).
       Thus, the rhetorical structure of prayer means the speech patterns often convey a 
message that is unrecognized by the speaker because of emotional ambiguity. Ethnographic 
studies on a range of prayer patterns reveal that at times the “tongue says one thing, but 
the mind thinks another” (Kharkhordin, 1999). Research on Zuni prayer in the Southern 
United States indicates that human deference is often the source of this incongruence, 
which is intensified by the individual’s private and personal relationship towards God. 
Oleg Kharkhordin contextualizes this latent content of prayer with the example of self-
condemnation and marked code switching that reveals an un-articulated step towards self-
perfection (Kharkhordin, 1999). Often un-articulated elements come at moments of stress, 
when subjects “find themselves saying things they have not consciously meant” (Bennett, 
2011). This indicates the hazy and fluid nature of religious speech, and prayer’s flexible 
implication for both God and the speaker. 
       The underlying message of the “Punk Prayer” video is similarly hazy, but it is clear 
that the women’s use of prayer transgressed and re-shaped the boundaries of protest and 
religious expression in Russia with their violation of a traditionally private and sacred 
act. While a range of elements that include “topic, context, age, generation, sex, kinship, 
dialect, group membership, political authority, and emotional solidarity” can influence lin-
guistic decisions, public and private context is crucial (Friedrich, 1972, p. 271). The church 
setting Pussy Riot used to film the “Punk Prayer” was an appropriate space for religious 
speech, but the visible and flamboyant nature of the video as well as the public forum of 
YouTube is in violation of church customs. Prayer in the Russian Orthodox Church is 
secluded and personal, and employs language choices that show a close emotional connec-
tion with God (Bennett, 2011). Scholarship describes the church in Russia as an “experi-
ence of compulsory privacy” marked by individualism (Agadjanian, 2006). Similarly, the 
act of prayer may take place anywhere within the public space of the church, but is usually 
a solo activity, with church attendees waiting their turn to individually approach an icon 
or light a candle. In contrast, the “Punk Prayer” improperly moved into the public sphere, 
despite how rhetorical elements of the lyrics indicate a private setting.
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       This transgression of privacy takes place within the rhetorical structure of the “Punk 
Prayer” lyrics. The women sing the phrase “Patriarch Gundyay,” a reference to Patriarch 
Krill of Moscow. Not only does the group neglect to use the patriarch’s Church title, they 
refer to him as “Gundyay” rather thanhis actual name “Gundyayev.” This decision was 
considered a “harmless… nickname” by previous scholars, yet it indicates a disregard for 
a complex set of colloquial linguistic rules (Rumen, 2012). Colloquial language choice in 
Russian is defined as any element of speech that varies from traditional and standard for-
mats. Specifically, the use of “Gundyay” not “Gundyayev” is an example of a segment dele-
tion, and is a common means to represent familiarity in Russian culture. Segment deletion 
occurs in everyday speech, such as the when the greeting “zdravstvujte” (здравствуйтe) 
is shortened to “zdravst” (здравст) among friends in a private setting (Yokoyama, 1994). 
Similarly, this occurs with deletions in personal names, such as the transition from “Masha” 
to “Mash.” A short name may be used in the context of a home, yet in public discourse 
only a full name is used. Pussy Riot crossed this boundary and created an inappropriate 
sense of pseudo-connection assumed to exist between the Church head and the Russian 
population with their reference to “Patriarch Gundyay.”
       Marked linguistic decisions that indicate a transgression of privacy were not limited 
to one phrase of the “Punk Prayer.” The group also relied on repetition to convey a 
sense of informality unconventional in modern Russian. Scholars who deconstructed the 
group’s lyrics do not analyze the repetition of the words “Drive away Putin” and “Become 
a Feminist,” perhaps because of differences in Russian and English structure. Repetition 
as a means to convey a private and familiar setting is seen in a range of Russian speech. 
Olga Yokoyama cites the Russian folk tale “Shepherds, shepherds, whose flock you herd,” 
as an intensification of informal discourse meant to convey private advice and closeness 
(Yokoyama, 1994). Historically the tale was passed down through generations and was 
exchanged between two people in an isolated setting. Literary critic Ewa Thompson also 
explores the idea of repetition in her work on Pushkin. She states that his poems “consist 
of a repetition that would not occur in everyday economical language.” This rhetorical 
strategy produces a sense of relaxation and informality (Thompson, 1971, p. 127). While 
repetition in Russian may be used simply to drive home a point, it also implies a “grammar 
of closeness” that Pussy Riot should not have had access to. Pussy Riot did not know their 
audience, yet they conveyed familiarity with their lyrics. This assumption of informality is 
unconventional in an often formal Russian society, and ultimately created an underlying 
anxiety and sense of discomfort among viewers.
Spectacle and the “Punk Prayer”
     The “Punk Prayer” video transgresses privacy boundaries, which were displayed to 
the public when it became an Internet spectacle. If Foucauldian discipline is constructed 
through self-agency and contemplation about self-disclosure, the video subtly influences 
expression and perception.  The uneasiness that the video elicits derives from the embed-
ded, implicit nature of surveillance activity within the film. By altering how the Russian 
population perceives and expresses itself, the “Punk Prayer” video mimics the very methods 
of surveillance it so adamantly criticizes. This form of spectacle creates anxiety because the 
tendency to assert ideological control with the use of a spectacle was a strong element of 
both Soviet and Russian surveillance, and carries associations redolent of expressive oppres-
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sion. Helped by the shock value of their footage, the “Punk Prayer” video was a YouTube 
spectacle that garnered millions of views around the world. Theorists define the spectacle 
as a performance or environment that “renders a small number of objects accessible to the 
inspection of a multitude of men” (Dirks, 1994, p. 150). While the party that consumes the 
spectacle has the power of choice about what they experience, many place the producer as 
the ultimate bearer of power. Spectacle serves as an endless lure to our attention, and shapes 
perceptions of reality though a unique and creative interpretation (Gross, 2003). 
       The power of spectacle has been recognized and deployed by the modern state. By 
shifting people’s gaze in a particular direction, spectacle serves to expand the public sphere 
and expose lives and ideas that were previously private.  Historians and political scientists 
have long studied how these state-regulated institutions and spaces have been crucial for the 
development of a collective identity (Bennett, 2011). Bruce D’Arcus argues that spectacles 
within public space fueled the Civil Rights Movement in the United States by serving as a 
symbolic marker of spatial access (D’Arcus, 2003). Protests in southern states were dramatic 
and highly visible in public locations, which conveyed a sense of the ongoing political 
struggle. Manfredo Tafuri contextualizes this political focus in his statement that “the spec-
tacle demands of the audience not a few pennies and the pleasant wasting of several hours 
but the life-long commitment to the institution that staged the show” (Dirks, 1994, p. 514). 
This “show” can include demonstrations and performances, or more subtle forms of exhibi-
tion such as museums or parks. Currently, the scope of the spectacle extends to the Internet.
Surveillance
       The idea that Internet use foments an internalized positionality defined by obedience is 
relevant to the assessment of the Internet within the context of social and political realities, 
not as the zone of unlimited freedom through which many interpreted the “Punk Prayer.” 
Media expert Julien Nocetti argues that the government’s regulation of media contributed 
to the de-intellectualization of the Soviet community. Through the regulation of media, 
the Soviet government was able to control the sphere and range of public thought to 
approved boundaries during the 1970s and 1980s, which produced a singular narrative that 
curtailed self-expression of both media producers and consumers (Nocetti, 2011). The pres-
ence of the government was visually evident in constant arrests in public spaces by police 
officers, which was symbolized through the secret police as a means to maintain control. 
The Cheka, which was later called the KGB, became the “primary weapon for the con-
solidation and maintenance of state power” (Whitaker, 1999, p. 21).
       However, this came with appalling human costs. Journalists who published stories 
against the Soviet regime faced forced labor camps, political exile, and death, which led 
to self-censorship on the part of newspaper, television, and even sitcoms to government-
approved expression (Piacentini, 2006). The 1930s were marked by brutal show trials that 
were motived in part by growing paranoia among the population. These trials created 
fear among the populace and helped create a sense of obligation to the party government 
(Hodos, 1987).
       However, instead of print media or trials, the “Punk Prayer” incited compliance 
through the Internet and YouTube. The space of YouTube, a main vehicle for transmission 
and access to information for Russian citizens since the early 2000s, is integral to music, 
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interpersonal relations, and entertainment. While the government does not block sites, all 
materials move through a central portal called RUNET (Nocetti, 2011). This term refers 
to the Russian language Internet sphere, which is monitored by the Russian government 
through secondary and tertiary surveillance. Frank Bannister blames regulatory technology 
such as RUNET for breeches in personal expression and freedom. He states that “advances 
in technology and changes in the way that we communicate and store information have 
steadily increased the vulnerability of informational privacy” (Bannister, 2005, p. 65).
       Lead by Rafal Rohozinski, scholars have branded these Russian methods of regula-
tion that lead to this obedience “creeping authoritarianism” (Deibert, 2011). Unlike the 
Chinese, the Russian government does not block Facebook or other social media websites, 
but instead monitors content from afar. Rohozinski argues that this creates a subliminal 
form of control, as the government’s presence is not obvious in everyday Internet use. 
This constructs the appearance of a more nuanced community, as it is common to forget 
that surveillance regulates and controls actions when it occurs on an unconscious level 
(Deibert, 2011). A crucial shift in surveillance methods is reflected in the less invasive form 
used today, as panoptic surveillance is gradually replaced by less visible means of effecting 
control. William Bogard’s observation is telling: “Surveillance, we are told, is discreet, 
unobtrusive, camouflaged, unverifiable—all elements of artifice designed into an architec-
tural arrangement of spaces to produce real effects of discipline. Eventually this will lead, by 
its means of perfection, to the elimination of the Panopticon itself” (Bogard, 1996, pg.__). 
       In modern Russia and in the YouTube “Punk Prayer” video, there is no visible 
Soviet style Panopticon to watch over citizens. However, as both Bogard and Hall Roberts 
emphasize, even if we do not consciously realize surveillance methods, this does not indi-
cate their lack of power (Roberts, n.d.). Subtle surveillance engenders the formation of 
different identities through the Internet and impacts how consumers view both the Russian 
government and the “Punk Prayer.” Although imagined communities constructed via the 
Internet share ideological characteristics with those constructed by print media, scholars 
often view communities of the Internet to be informed by notions of liberation as opposed 
primarily to notions of nationalism. This sense of liberation is attributed to the assump-
tion that Internet users have a choice of what they view and consume. However, the very 
parameters of choice are in fact implicitly contained by those who choose to post informa-
tion, which contains liberation (Robins, 1995). Deployment of technology to create and 
distribute a video must be seen as aligned with a form of scrutiny that reflects the operation 
of disciplinary power. Pussy Riot’s video is no exception to this statement, but is instead 
haunted by the ghost of a panoptic society where surveillance generates self-censorship.
Methodology
       My literature review has explored and analyzed the discourse of the two-minute 
“Punk Prayer” video. This analysis has focused primarily on the religious setting of the 
“Punk Prayer” and prayer as a form of expression, and how traditional rules were violated 
when Pussy Riot made their video public. Prayer in the Russian Orthodox Church is a 
private and contained event, and is distinctly personal, which I have outlined through a 
series of linguistic transgressions in the song’s lyrics. My subsequent analysis will continue 
to explore findings from in-person interviews, as well as an analysis of blog posts and com-
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ments. Secondly, I will examine the composition of the “Punk Prayer” video, including 
the framing of the film and the women’s fashion decisions.
       In the first component of my primary analysis, I gained insight into the “Punk Prayer” 
through a series of interviews. To inform my knowledge of the role of music videos and 
Internet social media in modern Russian culture, I conducted oral interviews with 10 
Russians from the age of 18 to 25. Interviews took place in Kazan, a city located east 
of Moscow, during the summer of 2014.  While I was attending class at the Institute of 
Economics, Management and Law in Kazan, I was able to meet with Russian students of 
the appropriate age group. Interviews were structured very informally, and started with the 
question: “Why do you watch music videos online?” and “What attracts you to specific 
videos?” If these questions did not lead to the subject of activism and protest movements, 
I asked if they liked videos with a secondary message and eventually brought up the topic 
of the “Punk Prayer” video. This allowed me to initially avoid the potentially sensitive 
and controversial issue of Pussy Riot, but still gave me access to information about how 
Russians perceive and interpret the intersection of the Internet, music, and power relations. 
       I did not bring up the Pussy Riot video during the majority of my interviews, in 
part because of the complex nature of my research question, as well as the controversial 
and political nature of the group. Several students discussed the topic of the “Punk Prayer” 
outside of a formal interview setting, which I included in my analysis. However, the major-
ity of the subject pool discussed other bands, Internet forums, and media trends outside of 
protest movements. Because of this limitation, my ethnographic data revealed little about 
the specific role of surveillance and power in the “Punk Prayer” video, but instead provided 
general information about Russian attitudes towards the group. 
       The second component of my examination will include analysis of discourse surround-
ing the “Punk Prayer.” After the production of the video, Russian-based blogs created posts 
about the group’s video and subsequent comments responded to such analysis. The dis-
course used in these blog posts will form the basis of my primary research. Unlike YouTube 
comments, blog posts and their interpretations are less likely to be deleted and can be easily 
searched by time and location. Using search fields to limit responses, I located comments 
originating from Russia that occurred most recently after the video was posted, during the 
start of the trial, and after the women were eventually released from prison. With two posts 
in each category, I deconstruct language and references using similar discursive strategies I 
employed for the lyrics of the “Punk Prayer.” This analysis will focus on the terms “fool” 
and “hooligan” and the ways these terms both explicitly and implicitly reveal trends in 
underlying anxiety created by the posting and content of the video and how this reflects 
on a historical and political context. 
       My secondary analysis will focus on the implications of the “Punk Prayer” video 
footage, and then will shift to an analysis of the video techniques used. Pussy Riot took 
time to construct their video to appeal to viewers and create a unique image. I analyze the 
implications of these strategic film edits as well as the similarities between historical montage 
in the Soviet Union and Pussy Riot’s “Punk Prayer.” Montage is not a new element to 
Russian film, as David Bordwell has shown in his analysis of Soviet cinematography. Soviet 
cinematographic techniques are characterized by juxtaposition and narratives throughout 
that were intended as a metaphorical commentary (Bordwell, 1997). Many Soviet-era films 
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were montages, which allowed producers to build their own narrative outside of the direct 
footage as well as make up for a lack of raw film. This construction of a narrative is seen 
in the underlying composition of the “Punk Prayer” video, which also included little raw 
footage.
       Finally, I mirror the strategies Norman Fairclough uses in his analysis of power relations 
to further examine the lyrics of the “Punk Prayer” (Fairclough, 1995). My focus will be on 
both youth and members of the public involved in the political sphere and how the defini-
tion of words shifts between these subsets of the Russian population. I am predominantly 
interested in the historical context of words and the rhetorical connections with Moscow’s 
Cathedral of Christ the Savior, the site of Pussy Riot’s video. This is particularly important 
given the political associations of the church as well as its prominent role in Russian history. 
My work will also compare Pussy Riot’s lyrics to those found in the songs of their prede-
cessor protest movement, the group Voina, as well as the Ukrainian group Femen (“Pussy 
Riot! A Punk Prayer for Freedom,” 2013). Voina and Femen are not primarily musical 
groups, but instead rely on vandalism, street protests, demonstrations, and impromptu per-
formances. Voina became well known in Russia for their political stab at Medvedev in the 
song “Fuck for the heir Puppy Bear,” which took place during the elections of 2008. This 
politically charged activism through spectacle served as a model for the women of Pussy 
Riot (Kolesova, 2013). Given that Pussy Riot looked up to Voina and mimicked their style 
of activism, methods used by both Voina and Femen will provide an ideological context 
for understanding the tension of the “Punk Prayer.”
Responses to Pussy Riot’s "Punk Prayer"
Interview Evidence 
       Interviews with Russian students revealed that notions of national identity shape 
interpretations of YouTube as a form of protest. As most students described, people do not 
usually imitate the styles and dress they see in videos, particularly for videos with Russian 
origins.  One student “Maria” described that she did not usually listen to any music vid-
eos online and that she did not think it was as common to copy or create a music video 
with some form of secondary message. The meaning behind songs was not something any 
student cited as important; instead, students preferred funny videos or songs they could 
replicate in popular karaoke bars. Similarly, “Katya” noted, “We usually don’t actually 
watch the music videos, like I assume you do in the United States. We don’t play the clips 
at all usually, but instead listen to music on CDs. The Internet isn’t used as much as in the 
United States.”
       Beyond attitudes towards Russian-based YouTube videos, my interviews with stu-
dents also indicate underlying trends with regards to Pussy Riot’s video as a spectacle. 
When I brought up the topic of Pussy Riot, students generally felt that the group’s video 
was an attempt by the women to show off or get attention. A student from Moscow State 
University described to me that he/she doesn’t “understand why Pussy Riot is such a big 
deal in the United States. In Russia we think they are kind of crazy. They are crazy girls 
that wanted to get a bunch of attention, but they don’t really mean anything to Russia as a 
country.” References to Pussy Riot as “crazy” was a sentiment echoed by other students, 
who all categorized the video and the women who participated as foolish and ineffective.
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Notions of Hooligans and Fools
       Similar ideas were referenced in the Russian blogosphere. However, despite the dis-
cursive range of opinions across blog sites and by pundits, the majority of posts persistently 
mention the key words of both hooliganism and foolishness in reference to the video.  This 
occurs both explicitly and implicitly and warrants further examination through discourse 
analysis.  Blogs provide a moderately unregulated forum in Russia in which to search 
through time and topic. The original YouTube video of the “Punk Prayer” was disabled 
shortly before the start of the trial, making YouTube comments impossible to trace.  Blogs 
in Russia have been labeled by media scholarship as a “substitute for public space” and a 
“paradoxical mixture of public and the private” (Gorny, n.d., p. 10). Despite the informal 
nature of blogs in Russia, they have the ability to convey attitudes of social change. The 
historical background and rhetorical development in Russian of these two terms indicates 
further links between Pussy Riot’s video and the surveillance methods of the Soviet gov-
ernment and helps to explain the discomfort seen in people’s reactions to the video. Thus, 
I will describe the historical and Soviet implications of the words “hooligan” and “fool” 
and explore the subsequent definitions of such words within the context of a selection of 
blog posts and comments.
       Hooliganism within Russia has been primarily defined within a cultural setting and 
therefore the requirements for the label have shifted throughout history. The term has 
encompassed religious crimes such as markedly “disrespectful” acts that included “chop-
ping up icons for firewood to heat tea” (Neuberger, 1993, p. 151). Hooligans were often 
children or poor workers on the streets and were known for terrorizing the general popula-
tion (Fitzpatrick, 1999). Throughout Soviet history, government officials deported 19,000 
individuals who they labeled as a possessing a hooligan element. Anger towards the govern-
ment and open hostility towards Soviet ideals is generally considered the impetus for this 
violence. Thus, hooliganism was often feared in the government because it was considered 
a way to disrupt the peace (Fitzpatrick, 1999).
       While hooliganism as a crime in Russia was first used to refer to people who defied 
the government regime, it was also used to reference vigilante groups partially supported 
by the communist government. Scholars argue that the Soviet government understood 
the power of hooligan groups and used their power for government ideologies. These 
activists were generally youth and “saw themselves as a vanguard” (Fitzpatrick, 1999). 
Such youth activists were employed when a disturbance was necessary or as a means to 
distract the population from other events. Similarly, even hooligans who were not directly 
involved with the Soviet government typically focused their violence towards civilians, not 
policemen or government officials. As Vladimir Kozlov notes, “hooligan gangs for a long 
time showed relative loyalty to authorities,” and only targeted officials if they were direct 
obstacles (Kozlov, 2002, p. 31). Thus, the origins of hooliganism carry a discursive mix of 
definitions as both useful and harmful protest for governmental means. 
       This tendency of bloggers to cite the women with discursive words was not isolated. 
The women of Pussy Riot were referenced as “fools” by multiple blog posters and pundits. 
The word dyrak (дурак) has implications that carry historical and religious significance 
in Russian culture. The “fool,” can reference the holy fool, who traveled across Russia 
advocating for the virtues of the Orthodox Church through humor and attention-seeking 
Pussy Riot's "Punk Prayer"
Katherine Schroeder University of Washington56
measures. The fool was considered to be clever and was “eccentric in clothing, speech, and 
behavior” (Klots, n.d., p. 2). While the primary role of the church was to fight atheism, 
fools were noted for their childish nature and their ability to perform both harmless pranks 
and serious troublemaking, particularly in Russian folklore. 
       However, beyond the wild appearance and role of the fool, the word also carries 
notions of power. By referencing Pussy Riot as “fools,” pundits convey similar ideas of 
cleverness. Because the fool was able to explore relations of power, it was “viewed with 
both fear and respect, and was an unlikely hero” (Klots, n.d., p. 2). This respect is evidenced 
by the reverent portrayal of the fool throughout Russian literature (Wigzell, 1988). Part of 
the fool’s power derives from his ability to mix within social groups and create both a sense 
of pride and respect among the community through humor.  References to the concept 
of the fool persisted into the time of the Soviet Union when the fool was used as a subtle 
means to criticize Western traditions. This evolved during a campaign of patriotism during 
the 1930s that was marked, among other things, by a desire to embrace traditional Russian 
mediums such as folklore (Klots, n.d.).
Blog Post Analysis
       The majority of blog posts selected for my analysis are from the Russian blog web 
portal “Grani.” The blog forum was founded in December of 2000 and is a leading blog of 
political thought in Russia. It gathers work from professional journalists and influential pun-
dits within Russia, as well as public opinions, and allows for highly utilized comment sec-
tions.  In part because of the blog’s tendency to discuss human rights questions, it recently 
received publicity as the target of March 2014 censorship from the Russian government. I 
will examine two blog posts and their range of comments from the established three time 
periods and will determine trends in word usage and references of notions of foolishness 
and hooliganism. The first time point in my analysis will be posts within two weeks of the 
original Pussy Riot “Punk Prayer” YouTube video posting on February 21, 2012. This will 
allow me to explore comments that focus on the video without interferences from official 
or government opinions. Next, I will focus on articles published approximately within 
two weeks of the start of the August 17, 2012 trial. This provides insight into government 
opinions and their intersection with other media forums. Finally, I will examine how blog 
posts and comments were shaped after Pussy Riot’s December 23, 2013 release from prison. 
This period allows for an exploration of public reactions to Pussy Riot’s sanctions as well 
as popular opinions towards the group.
       Comments and blog posts around the time of February 21, 2012 are noted by their 
harsh references towards the women, despite the fact that no government rhetoric was 
released about the video. One of the blog posters stated: “So the other day Alexei Navalny 
hastened to disown [Pussy Riot] and calls the girls hooligan and fools” (Adomanis, 2012). 
Such a comment is indicative of the harsh connotations associated with both words, which 
is supported by comments in his article that describe the women’s prank as a “disgrace,” 
and replete with “disrespect.” The women’s action and video were summarized as a fool-
ish farce and bloggers and commenters did not acknowledge any redeeming or intellectual 
qualities of the video. Secondly, the comments from the time of the video’s release focused 
primarily on the religious nature of the women’s actions and the ways in which the act of 
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filming was sacrilegious. The focus on religious blasphemy motivated commenters to heav-
ily criticize the women’s actions and label their spectacle a crime. One commenter even 
stated that the population should “crucify them” as punishment for their religious disobedi-
ence (“Грани.Ру | Артур Аристакисян: Плоть и кровь Pussy Riot,” 2012). 
       Perhaps because of such religious implications, the blog posts and comments empha-
sized the negative aspects of the women’s depiction as hooligans. One pundit wrote, “the 
girls are talented and beautiful, but Putin and Medvedev are boring and mediocre. The 
people in this sense cannot be fooled” (“Грани.Ру | Артур Аристакисян: Плоть и кровь 
Pussy Riot,” 2012). While this may seem like a compliment, by focusing on the beauty of 
the women, the commenter ignores the political power of the “Punk Prayer” and instead 
labels the public as foolish for paying attention to Pussy Riot’s actions.
       During the start of the trial during August of 2012, blog-post comments and notions of 
hooliganism and foolishness were shaped heavily by the intersection between the Russian 
government’s rhetoric and opinions in the West about the pervasiveness of Pussy Riot’s 
video. One article states that the trial was an example of “fools as fools.” Other commenters 
mentioned that the foolish nature of the women of the “Punk Prayer” was a consequence 
of attitudes in the United States that made ideas of human rights and activism wrongly 
acceptable (“Грани.Ру: Две участницы Pussy Riot покинули Россию,” 2012). However, 
despite the generally negative tone of comments and ideas expressed, the women were also 
characterized by bloggers as clever and enduring, providing a sharp contrast to much more 
critical comments earlier in the year (“Грани.Ру: МИД: Запад забыл о нормах морали,” 
2012).
       This idea of foolishness and that Pussy Riot should be punished as fools relates to 
traditional notions of the fool referenced throughout Russian literature. This similarity is 
most evident in the comparison between Pussy Riot’s “Punk Prayer” and scholarship that 
describes elements of Russian folklore and Ivan the fool. Ivan is characterized by his childish 
sense of fun, as well as his constant pranks and buffoonery. However, while he is able and 
capable of harmless pranks, he also works to serve the church with his fight against athe-
ism (Wigzell, 1988). Unlike previous observations, this comparison represents a shift from 
comments that focused on Pussy Riot’s role as silly women in the protest act to comments 
framing them as valid protesters with credibility and a defined political message. However, 
this increased support for Pussy Riot’s actions did not endure after the trial. 
       Comments from December 23, 2013 focused on more theoretical concepts than the 
discourse of the fool and the “crimes” Pussy Riot committed. Notably, the women are 
compared in a post to writer and historical Russian dissenter Anton Chekhov (“Грани.Ру: 
По капле и есть по капле,” 2013). This indicates that popular opinion had shifted from 
notions of the women as stupid and foolish with their prank to the prank holding a higher 
intellectual capacity.  Posts from after the arrest also reference the United States as a country 
of fools. This idea was based on the notion that because rhetoric focused on human rights 
and elevated the status of Pussy Riot, the West did not fully consider the severity of the 
crimes committed. 
       This human rights focus and comparison to Chekhov indicates the strong politi-
cal nature of Pussy Riot’s “Punk Prayer.” However, Pussy Riot, like Chekhov, are both 
shaped within the framework of Soviet governmental regulations. Scholars who describe 
57
Pussy Riot's "Punk Prayer"
the political nature of Chekhov and the pseudo-political messages his stories portray mirror 
this attitude. In the case of the short novel Volodia, a young boy is portrayed as discover-
ing his sexuality. While many view the novel as a political statement about the problems 
of prostitution in Russia, the story is limited by censorship, and thus the political message 
is blurred to the general population (Rayfield, 1999). Another unnamed story by Chekhov 
conveys a similar message of ambiguous political questions. The story describes a protago-
nist who works as a servant and “makes no progress with political aims” (Rayfield, 1999, 
p. 119). The story lacks plausibility, and once again, censorship obfuscates the intended 
political message (Rayfield, 1999). This blurred political nature is seen in the “Punk Prayer” 
and is evidenced by the ambiguity of reactions.
Discussion
       Such changes in the perspective of both pundits and the population in Russia indicate 
the discursive nature of Pussy Riot. Not only did feminists, political protesters, and religious 
leaders constantly disagree about the central message of the “Punk Prayer,” the source and 
nature of the anxiety the video creates changes across time (“Россияне о деле Pussy Riot,” 
2012). This may be due to an increase in Western rhetoric about the group and the desire of 
the West to inaccurately represent Pussy Riot’s “Punk Prayer” as a specific brand of politi-
cal protest. This influence is evidenced by continual and increased references to the women 
within the context of “America” as well as references to notions of human-rights activism. 
Thus, the events that contextualize the “Punk Prayer” video serve only to increase anxiety 
and complicate the range of discursive reactions that surround the group.
Video Analysis
      Beyond discourse, the structural and aesthetic qualities of the “Punk Prayer” video 
are indicative of Soviet-era rhetoric and methods of power. While critics may argue that 
the decision to film the “Punk Prayer” footage at the Church of Christ the Savior was a 
product of the church’s central location in Moscow, in reality the church holds significance 
for the government and population.  During Pussy Riot’s trial, Patriarch Krill said that the 
women should be punished in part because of their specific decision to film in the Church 
of Christ the Savior.  The patriarch argued that Russia owes much of its existence to the 
church and stated that it was constructed to commemorate Russia’s victory over Napoleon 
in 1812. The church was even compared to a shrine and “the patriarch argued for the 
national significance of the cathedral by underlying its historical context” (Robin, 2013).
Framing       
       Beyond the decision to use the Church of Christ the Savior, the way the “Punk Prayer” 
used montage to create their two-minute YouTube video is reminiscent of Soviet methods 
of film creation. Soviet montage is typically characterized by brief shots of original footage 
mixed with a strong and distinct narrative (Bordwell, 1972). David Bordwell illuminates 
the importance of montage in Soviet films in his description of how montage was used to 
construct the narrative of a story (Bordwell, 1972). Often, viewers were unable to follow 
the exact film sequences, which were conveyed through bright lighting and a quick mix 
of images. While montage was often merely used to compensate for a lack of footage and 
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resources during the 1920s and 1930s, it was also a way to convey ideas that extended 
beyond the film, as well as to manipulate viewers (Bordwell, 1972). This idea of extending 
a narrative is particularly evident in the film “Fall of the Romanov Dynasty,” as described 
by Graham Roberts. Roberts explains that the film as well as other Soviet films often used 
montage to convey specific educational messages or ideas about the West (Roberts, 1999). 
       Beyond the strategic use of montage, the “Punk Prayer” uses video to convey religious 
ideologies. The footage is shot in a way that focuses on the church's icons throughout the 
video. While part of this is a product of the heavy presence of icons in Russian Orthodox 
churches, each edge of the “Punk Prayer” video is framed with icons of Jesus or Mary. 
This indicates the importance of icons for the Church and the authority of the Russian 
Orthodox leaders. Scholarship on the topic agrees that icons were a way for the govern-
ment to instill religious ideologies after the end of the Soviet Union (Espinola, 1992). 
While only a small percentage of the population attended church during the 1990s, almost 
every home in Russia had an icon on its walls, and icons were important symbols of the 
power and presence of the church.
Fashion in the “Punk Prayer”
       The fashion choices of Pussy Riot in the video are also distinctive. Characterized by 
bright block layers and signature Doc Martin shoes, scholars attribute the outfit choice to 
Pussy Riot’s desire to have their outfits repeated.  Russian girls and other activists are easily 
able to replicate Pussy Riot’s appearance through simple dresses, bright designs, and bala-
clavas cut out of socks. This ability to replicate the style of Pussy Riot has been seen in a 
range of contemporary art based on the group, which emphasizes the signature dresses and 
balaclavas. Similarly, protest groups have mimicked Pussy Riot’s bright colors and outfits 
since 2012 and have subsequently caught the attention of the Russian public and police. 
Others cite the convenience of the outfits as a motivation for their presence in the film 
(“Pussy Riot! A Punk Prayer for Freedom,” 2013). Not only could bright tights and dresses 
be purchased at low costs, they also allowed the women to blend into the general popula-
tion on the streets of Moscow before their church performance.        
      Regardless of the intentions of Pussy Riot’s fashion decisions, the impact of their 
clothing as symbols of their video and lyrics is reminiscent of Soviet methods of fashion as 
a means of symbolizing ideologies. Fashion was a historical point of ideological contention 
during the era of the Cold War. While “frumpy women” did little to help raise support 
for socialist ideals, the presence of Western fashion was representative of consumerism and 
Western indulgence. However, this ideological paradox was addressed through a distinct 
and plain Soviet fashion (Reid, 2002). This symbolically simple style represented a way to 
distinguish the Soviet Union from the West as well as create an image of the ideal woman. 
While the end result of their fashion choices was different, the impacts of Pussy Riot’s out-
fits are reminiscent of the Soviet Union through their ability to create an ideological and 
symbolic force among observers. 
       This comparison is first seen in the way the outfit choices of Pussy Riot violated 
religious rules. While the women covered their hair, their tight and form-fitting cloth-
ing was considered unacceptable by religious leaders who learned of the “Punk Prayer” 
video. Similar to this underlying statement against the institution of the Church, Soviet 
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fashion created subtle notions of distaste against the United States and the West. Women 
in the 1930s in Russia were warned that simplicity was crucial and that “too much is bad” 
(Paulicelli, 2009, p. 81). In many ways, the simple prints and lack of brand names emulates 
this distaste for the West and instead places value on notions of simplicity.
       In the case of Soviet Union fashion, outfits were also used partially to convey mili-
tary force of the communist regime. This primarily took place through the fashion of the 
communist youth group “Komsomol,” which drew distinction because of the member’s 
uniform of “knickers, botinki stockings, semi-military tunics, and belts” (Fitzpatrick, 1999, 
p. 35). The Komsomol served as a symbol through their distinctive outfits and were able 
to work outside of the direct control of the Soviet regime to activate the youth base. The 
Komsomol’s propaganda was targeted towards children aged fifteen and older and was 
meant to introduce children to Soviet ideologies and rituals. Komsomol and the fashion 
of the group was a symbol for Soviet-era morality and was considered to be the building 
block of ethical development for children (Halstead, 1994). However, the importance of 
the group and their distinctive nature was not possible without their signature outfits. 
       This fashion as well as the overall anxiety created by the “Punk Prayer” must also 
be considered within the context of similar protest groups. Much scholarship compares 
Voina’s protest efforts to Pussy Riot’s “Punk Prayer.” The groups are indeed similar, as 
Tolokonnikova was an original member of Voina and later formed the basis of the organi-
zational structure of Pussy Riot. However, Pussy Riot’s relationship between discourse and 
protest is much different from Voina’s. Instead of a focus on discourse and lyrics, much of 
Voina’s protests involved physical acts and scenarios. During one protest, the group faked a 
legal execution in order to decry Russian attitudes towards gay and immigrant populations. 
Another more famous protest involved the group engaging in group sex in a museum in 
Moscow. While these protests contrast the “Punk Prayer” in their notable lack of a message 
through rhetoric and discourse, they have a similar shock value. However, in both cases, 
the central message of the protest is not immediately clear to viewers, but instead requires 
additional analysis.
Conclusion
       While they started as a motley collective with little public attention and even fewer 
resources, the “Punk Prayer” video launched Pussy Riot into a globally recognized brand. 
Pussy Riot and their infamous prank not only gained international attention; they also 
received interviews from coveted Western media outlets and even a photo shoot in Vogue 
magazine (Corbett, 2014). This attention has sparked widespread interest in the group and 
has motivated further performances, for instance one during the Sochi Olympics of 2014 
(“Pussy Riot whipped at Sochi Games by Cossacks,” 2014). Despite the fact that the group 
claims their end goal centered on human-rights questions within Russia rather than on 
business antics, evidence of the power of Pussy Riot’s brand have increased since the last 
member was released from prison. 
       Pussy Riot’s members claim that they do not own their brand and are not inter-
ested in creating a business. While the group allegedly operates from small-scale donations 
and refuses sponsorship, one can purchase Pussy Riot t-shirts on American retail website 
Amazon and the group recently fought to trademark their name and image (Taylor, 2013). 
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This trademark would tentatively allow them to sell clothing, music devices, cosmetics, and 
even condoms across a range of European markets. Similarly, despite their anti-business 
focus, they are rumored to have been offered close to $700 million dollars by a United 
States music company to complete a world tour (Taylor, 2013). While the group’s lawyers 
have not commented to Western media sources about the future of the brand, it appears 
that the women behind the “Punk Prayer” are focused on preserving the group’s message 
and profits through strategic marketing. 
       It seems that this strategic branding, English-language advertising, and focus on 
Western consumers has made members of Pussy Riot popular in the Western world and 
in the United States. However, this is not the case in Russia, where the majority of the 
country considers Pussy Riot both irresponsible and irrelevant. This lack of appeal within 
their home country raises questions about the validity of the protest Pussy Riot employed 
in their “Punk Prayer.” While the words of the “Punk Prayer” may speak about Putin and 
the Russian Orthodox Church, they remain unpopular and ignored in the country they 
implored to implement change. This perhaps indicates the difficult environment activists 
and anti-governmental groups face within Russia. Pussy Riot may have been one of the 
most popular protest movements outside of Russia, but they were not the only group that 
faced oppression and prosecution for their actions. 
       Regardless of their inability to effect change within Russia, Pussy Riot has undeniably 
obtained a high level of success and popularity outside of Russia. News media has noted 
that this elaborate branding and marketing campaign as reminiscent of methods used to 
project an image of Putin as an honest and personable politician. This process also occurred 
in the Soviet Union during the election of Boris Yeltsin, when TV support was used as a 
fundamental tool to create a public stage (Zazurskii, 2004). The ways that this public stage 
developed has since shifted with the expansion of the Internet, with a greater focus of media 
perspectives now focusing on online rhetoric. Such efforts have centered on articles and 
television in primarily government-run Russian media and are a common element of both 
print capitalism and branding within Russia. 
       Regardless of any connections between the branding used in Pussy Riot and Putin's 
strategies, critics of the “Punk Prayer” video and Pussy Riot argue that the sleek new brand 
defies notions of what it means to be “punk.” While Pussy Riot has been censured for 
the poor lyrics and abrasive vocals that helped shape them as a Punk group, this label is no 
longer accurate and further contributes to the confusion and tension that the group creates. 
While the connotations of punk have shifted since the 1980s, the word itself as well as the 
people who identify with the word “punk” were generally associated with counter-culture 
movements and distaste for the business world (Bindas, 1993). However, Pussy Riot has 
avoided this approach, as the group now embraces a mainstream and primped image. 
       The “Punk Prayer” may no longer be considered punk as a consequence of the group’s 
now polished image; however, the ambiguity I seek to explain throughout the course of 
my analysis remains the same: Pundits and the public alike have been unable to explain 
both their strong reactions to the group and the actual message the women were attempt-
ing to project. Instead, the “Punk Prayer” has been experienced in Russia by a range of 
interpretations and a general sense of anxiety. The actual effect of the group’s activism will 
become clearer as the political environment in Russia shifts. However, what is clear is the 
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ways the video and the “Punk Prayer” mimic past methods of Soviet surveillance. Like the 
government they attempt to criticize, Pussy Riot’s actions and video are not always what 
they appear.
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